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Abstract
I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide denitions of
network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some
of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual
incentives to form and sever links.
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1 Introduction
The set of economic situations where network structures play an important role is wide
and varied. For instance, personal contacts play critical roles in obtaining information
about job opportunities.
1
Such networks of relationships also underlie the trade and ex-
change of goods in non-centralized markets
2
, the provision of mutual insurance in devel-
oping countries
3
, research and development and collusive alliances among corporations
4
,
and international alliances and trading agreements
5
; to mention just a few examples.
Given both the prevalence of situations where networks of relationships play a role,
and their importance in determining the outcome of the interaction, it is essential to
have theories about both how such networks structures matter and how they form. To
get a feeling for what kinds of issues arise and why we might be interested, let me
briey discuss an example. We know from extensive research in both sociology literature
and the labor economics literature that that social connections are the leading source
of information about jobs and ultimately many (and in some professions most) jobs

This was written for the volume Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions,
edited by Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders, which is forthcoming from Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge. I thank Jernej Copic, Sanjeev Goyal, and Anne van den Nouweland for comments on
earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
1
See, for example, Rees (1966), Granovetter (1973, 1974), Boorman (1975), Montgomery (1991),
Topa (2000), Arrow and Borzekowski (2001), Calvo-Armengol (2000), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2001, 2001b), Cahuc and Fontaine (2002), and Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2002).
2
See, for example, Tesfatsion (1997, 1998), Corominas-Bosch (1999), Weisbuch, Kirman and Herreiner
(2000), Charness, Corominas-Bosch, and Frechette (2001), Kranton and Minehart (2001), and Wang and
Watts (2002).
3
See Fafchamps and Lund (2000) and De Weerdt (2002).
4
See Bloch (2001), Belleamme and Bloch (2002), Goyal and Moraga (2001), Goyal and Joshi (2000),
and Billand and Bravard (2002).
5
See Goyal and Joshi (2001), Casella and Rauch (2001), and Furusawa and Konishi (2002).
are obtained through personal contacts.
6
The reason that we might care about this
is that the structure of the social network then turns out to be a key determinant of
(i) who gets which jobs, which has implications for social mobility, (ii) how patterns
of unemployment relate to ethnicity, education, geography, and other variables, and for
instance why there might be persistent dierences in employment between races, (iii)
whether or not jobs are being eÆciently lled, and (iv) the incentives that individuals
have to educate themselves and to participate in the workforce. Related to all of these
issues are what the impact of these things are on how people \network" or what social
ties they maintain, and ultimately whether the resulting labor markets work eÆciently,
and how dierent policies (for instance, aÆrmative action, subsidization of education,
etc.) will impact labor markets and how they might be best structured.
7
While this is
quite a list of issues to consider, it makes clear why understanding how networks operate
is of importance.
At this point it is useful to crudely divide situations where networks are important
into two dierent categories, to make clear what the scope of this survey will be. In one
category, the network structure is a distribution or service network that is the choice of a
single actor. For instance, the routing of planes by an airline
8
falls into this category, as do
many routing, transmission, and distribution network problems. In the other category of
situations where networks are critical, the network structure connects dierent individuals
and the formation of the network depends on the decisions of many participants. This
includes the examples mentioned above of labor markets, political alliances, and generally
any social network. It is this second category of network problems, where the networks
connect a number of individuals, that I survey here.
9
The recent and rapidly growing literature on network formation among individuals
addresses various questions. I concentrate on the following three:
(i) How are such network relationships important in determining the outcome of eco-
nomic interaction?
(ii) How can we predict which networks are likely to form when individuals have the
discretion to choose their connections?
(iii) How eÆcient are the networks that form and how does that depend on the way
that the value of a network is allocated among the individuals?
In terms of answering question (i), I will mostly just provide some examples (see Section
3), and the primary focus will be on questions (ii) and (iii).
6
The introduction in Montgomery (1991) provides a nice and quick overview of some of the studies on
this. Some of the seminal references are Granovetter (1973, 1974), who found that over 50% of surveyed
residents of a Massachusetts town had obtained their jobs through social contacts, and Rees (1966) who
found over 60% in a similar study.
7
See Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2001, 2001b) for a look at some of these issues.
8
See, for instance, Starr and Stinchcombe (1992) and Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1995).
9
There is some overlap, as for instance in the case of the choices of internet backbone providers that
aects the structure of the internet (e.g., see Badasyan and Chakrabarti (2003)).
2
Beyond the literature surveyed here, there is a well-established and vast literature
in sociology on social networks.
10
That literature makes clear the importance of social
networks in many contexts, and provides a detailed look at many issues associated with
social networks, ranging from measuring power and centrality to understanding the roles
of dierent sorts of social ties. While that literature provides a wealth of knowledge of
the workings of network interactions, largely missing from that literature are strategic
models of how networks are formed and in particular an understanding of the relation-
ship between individual incentives and overall societal welfare. The development of game
theoretic reasoning over past decades and its inux into economic models, has now come
together with a realization that network relationships play important roles in many eco-
nomic interactions. This has resulted in the birth of a literature that uses game theoretic
reasoning to develop such models of self-organizing network relationships. This is a
rapidly growing literature on a wide-open landscape with numerous important questions
to be addressed and a huge variety of potential applications. As such, I cannot hope to
cover all of the burgeoning literature here. I have the more modest aim of providing a
look at some of the modeling approaches, a feeling for the tension between individual
incentives to form links and societal welfare, and a glimpse of some of the applications
of the developing theories.
2 Dening Network Games
Network relationships come in many shapes and sizes, and so there is no single model
which encompasses them all. Here I focus on one way of modeling networks that will be
fairly broad and exible enough to capture a multitude of applications. As we proceed,
I will try to make clear what is being admitted and what is being ruled out.
Players
N = f1; : : : ; ng is a set of players or individuals who are connected in some network
relationship.
For this survey, I will refer to the individuals as \players" with the idea that they
may be individual people, they may be rms or other organizations, and they might even
be countries.
These players will be the nodes or vertices in a graph that will describe the network
relationships.
A common aspect to the papers in the literature surveyed here is that they model
situations where each player has discretion in forming his or her links in the network
relationship. These may be people deciding on whom they wish to be friends with,
10
An excellent and broad introductory text to the social networks literature is Wasserman and Faust
(1994).
3
or contract with, or pass job information to; these may be rms deciding on which
partnerships to engage in; or these may be countries deciding on which trade or defense
alliances to enter into.
Networks
Depending on the context the network relationship may take dierent forms. The
simplest form is a non-directed graph, where two players are either connected or not.
For instance in a network where links represent direct family relationships, the network
is naturally a non-directed network. Two players are either related to each other or
not, but it cannot be that one is related to the second without the second being related
to the rst. This is generally true of many social and/or economic relationships, such
as partnerships, friendships, alliances, acquaintances, etc.. This sort of network will be
central to the discussion below. However, there are other situations that are also discussed
below that are modeled as directed networks, where one player may be connected to a
second without the second being connected to the rst. For instance, a network that
keeps track of which authors reference which other authors, or which web sites have links
to which others would naturally be a directed network.
The distinction between directed and non-directed networks is not a mere technicality.
It is fundamental to the analysis as the applications and modeling are quite dierent. In
particular, when links are necessarily reciprocal, then it will generally be the case that
joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain the link. For instance, in order to
form a trading partnership, both partners need to agree. To maintain a friendship the
same is generally true, as is maintaining a business relationship, alliance, etc. In the
case of directed networks, one individual may direct a link at another without the other's
consent. These dierences result in some basic dierences in the modeling of network
formation.
Most economic applications fall into the reciprocal link (and mutual consent) frame-
work, and as such non-directed networks will be our central focus. Nevertheless, directed
networks are also of interest and I will return to discuss them briey at the end of this
survey.
In many situations links might also have some intensity associated with them. For
instance, if links represent friendships, some might be stronger than others and this might
have consequences, such as aecting the chance that information passes through a given
link. Much of the literature on network formation to date has been restricted to the case
where links are either present or not, and do not have intensities associated with them.
11
This makes representing networks a bit easier, as we can just keep track of which links
are present.
While the focus on 0-1 links is restrictive, it is still of signicant interest for at least
11
For exceptions, see Calvo, Lasaga, and van den Nouweland (1999), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2001, 2001b), and Goyal and Moraga (2001).
4
two reasons. First, much of the insight obtained in this framework is fairly robust, and so
this is a useful starting point. Second, the fact that the value and costs that are generated
by links may dier across links already allows for substantial heterogeneity and admits
enough exibility so that a large number of interesting applications are captured.
A network g is a list of which pairs of players are linked to each other. A network is
then a list of unordered pairs of players fi; jg.
For any pair of players i and j, fi; jg 2 g indicates that i and j are linked under the
network g.
For simplicity, write ij to represent the link fi; jg, and so ij 2 g indicates that i and
j are linked under the network g.
For instance, if N = f1; 2; 3g then g = f12; 23g is the network where there is a link
between players 1 and 2, a link between players 2 and 3, but no link between players 1
and 3.
t t t
1 2 3
Let g
N
be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. G = fg  g
N
g denotes the set of all
possible networks or graphs on N .
The network g
N
is referred to as the \complete" network.
Another prominent network structure is that of a \star" network, which is a network
where there exists some player i such that every link in the network involves player i. In
this case i is referred to as the center of the star.
A shorthand notation for the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing net-
work g is g+ij, and for the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network
g is g   ij.
Let
gj
S
= fij : ij 2 g and i 2 S; j 2 Sg:
Thus gj
S
is the network found deleting all links except those that are between players in
S.
For any network g, let N(g) be the set of players who have at least one link in the
network g. That is, N(g) = fi j 9j s:t: ij 2 gg.
Paths and Components
5
A path in a network g 2 G between players i and j is a sequence of players i
1
; : : : ; i
K
such that i
k
i
k+1
2 g for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K   1g, with i
1
= i and i
K
= j.
Looking at the path relationships in a network naturally partitions a network into
dierent connected subgraphs that are commonly referred to as components.
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g
0
 g, such that
 if i 2 N(g
0
) and j 2 N(g
0
) where j 6= i, then there exists a path in g
0
between i
and j, and
 if i 2 N(g
0
) and ij 2 g, then ij 2 g
0
.
Thus, the components of a network are the distinct connected subgraphs of a network.
In the gure below there are two components with ve agents each.
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The set of components of g is denoted C(g). Note that g = [
g
0
2C(g)
g
0
.
Note that under this denition of component, a completely isolated player who has
no links is not considered a component. If one wants to have a denition of component
that includes isolated nodes as a special case, then one can consider the partition induced
by the network.
Components of a network partition the players into groups within which players are
connected. Let (g) denote the partition of N induced by the network g.
12
Value Functions
The network structure is the key determinant of the level of productivity or utility to
the society of players involved. For instance, a buyer's expected utility from trade may
depend on how many sellers that buyer is negotiating with, and how many other buyers
they are connected to, etc. (as in Corominas-Bosch (1999) and Kranton and Minehart
(2001)). Similarly, a network where players have very few acquaintances with whom they
12
That is, S 2 (g), if and only if either there exists h 2 C(g) such that S = N(h), or there exists
i =2 N(g) such that S = fig.
6
share information will result in dierent employment patterns than one where players
have many such acquaintances (as in Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2001, 2001b)).
Methods of keeping track of the overall value generated by a particular network, as
well as how it is allocated across players, are through a value function and an allocation
rule. These are the natural extensions of the notions of characteristic function and
imputation rule from cooperative game theory. In cooperative game theory these would
depend just on the set of players involved, while here in the network setting they depend
on the full network structure rather than simply a coalition. In fact, in the special case
where the value generated only depends on connected components rather than network
structure, the value function and allocation rule reduce to a characteristic function (for
a cooperative game in partition function form) and imputation rule.
A value function is a function v : G! IR.
For simplicity, in what follows I maintain the normalization that v(;) = 0.
The set of all possible value functions is denoted V.
A prominent subclass of value functions is the set of component additive ones.
A value function v is component additive if
P
h2C(g)
v(h) = v(g).
Component additivity is a condition that rules out externalities across components,
but still allows them within components. It is quite natural in some contexts, for instance
social interactions, and not in others, for instance in an oligopoly setting where links are
alliances of some sort and dierent rms compete with each other.
Another prominent subclass of value functions is the set of anonymous ones.
Given a permutation of players  (a bijection from N to N) and any g 2 G, let
g

= f(i)(j)jij 2 gg.
Thus, g

is a network that shares the same architecture as g but with the players
relabeled according to .
A value function is anonymous if for any permutation of the set of players , v(g

) =
v(g).
Anonymity says that the value of a network is derived from the structure of the
network and not the labels of the players who occupy various positions.
It is important to note that dierent networks that connect the same players may lead
to dierent values. This makes a value function a much richer object than a characteristic
function used in cooperative game theory. For instance, a society N = f1; 2; 3g may have
7
a dierent value depending on whether it is connected via the network g = f12; 23g or
the network g
N
= f12; 23; 13g.
The special case where the value function depends only on the groups of players
that are connected, but not how they are connected, corresponds to the communication
networks (or cooperation structures) rst considered by Myerson (1977) and surveyed
in the chapter by van den Nouweland (2003). To be precise, Myerson started with a
transferable utility cooperative game in characteristic function form, and layered on top
of that network structures that indicated which players could communicate. A coalition
could only generate value if its members were connected via paths in the network. But,
the particular structure of the network did not matter, as long as the coalition's members
were connected somehow.
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Is the Value Necessarily the Same?
The approach surveyed here follows Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who dened the
value as a function that is allowed to depend on the specic network structure. A special
case is where v(g) only depends on the coalitions induced by the component structure of
g, which corresponds to the communication games. In most applications, however, there
may be some cost to links and thus some dierence in total value across networks even if
they connect the same sets of players, and so this more general and exible formulation
is more powerful and encompasses more applications.
It is also important to note that the value function can incorporate costs to links as
well as benets. It allows for quite general ways in which costs and benets may vary
across networks. This means that a value function allows for externalities both within
and across components of a network.
Network Games
A network game is a pair (N; v) where N is the set of players and v is a value function
on networks among those players.
This notion of network game might be thought of as the analog of a cooperative
game (rather than a non-cooperative game), as the allocation of values among players is
8
not specied. The use of such games will involve both cooperative and non-cooperative
perspectives, as they will be the basis for network formation. The augmenting of a
network game by an allocation rule, which we turn to next, will be what allows one to
model the formation of the network.
Allocation Rules
Beyond knowing how much total value is generated by a network, it is critical to keep
track of how that value is allocated or distributed among the players in the society. This
is captured by the concept of an allocation rule.
An allocation rule is a function Y : GV ! IR
N
such that
P
i
Y
i
(g; v) = v(g) for all
v and g.
Note that balance,
P
i
Y
i
(g; v) = v(g), is made part of this denition of allocation
rule.
Generally, there will be some natural way in which the value is allocated in a given
network situation. This might simply be the utility that the players directly receive,
accounting for both the costs and benets of maintaining their links, for instance in a
social network. This might also be the result of some bargaining about the terms of trade,
for instance in a network of international trading relationships. Beyond the allocations
that come naturally with the network, we might also be interested in designing the
allocation rule; that is, re-allocating value using taxes, subsidies and other transfers.
This might be motivated in a number of ways, including trying to aect the incentives
of players to form networks, or more simply for fairness reasons. Regardless of the
perspective taken, an allocation rule captures either an allocation that arises naturally
or an allocation of value that is imposed.
It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on both g and v. This allows
an allocation rule to take full account of a player i's role in the network. This includes
not only what the network conguration is, but also how the value generated depends
on the overall network structure. For instance, consider a network g = f12; 23g in a
situation where the value generated is 1 (v(g) = 1). Player 2's allocation might be
very dierent depending on what the values of other networks are. For instance, if
v(f12; 23; 13g) = 0 = v(f13g), then 2 is essential to the network and may receive a large
allocation. If on the other hand v(g
0
) = 1 for all networks, then 2's role is not particularly
special. This information can be relevant, especially in bargaining situations, which is
why the allocation rule is allowed to depend on it. I return to discuss this in more detail
below.
Before moving on, I note two properties of allocation rules that will come up repeat-
edly in what follows.
Component Balance
9
An allocation rule Y is component balanced if
P
i2S
Y
i
(g; v) = v(gj
S
) for each compo-
nent additive v, g 2 G and S 2 (g).
Component balance requires that the value of a given component of a network is
allocated to the members of that component in cases where the value of the component
is independent of how other components are organized. This would tend to arise naturally.
It also is a condition that an intervening planner or government would like to respect if
they wish to avoid secession by components of the network.
Anonymity of an Allocation Rule
Given a permutation  : N ! N , let v

be dened by v

(g) = v(g

 1
) for each g 2 G
(recalling the denition of g

from above). This is just value function obtained when
agents' names are relabeled through .
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v 2 V, g 2 G, and permutation of the
set of players , Y
(i)
(g

; v

) = Y
i
(g; v).
Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changed is the labels of
the players and the value generated by networks has changed in an exactly corresponding
fashion, then the allocation only change according to the relabeling.
13
3 Some Examples
In order to x some ideas and illustrate the above denitions, I now describe a few
examples of network situations that have been analyzed in the literature.
Example 1 The Connections Model (Jackson and Wolinsky (1996))
In this model, links represent social relationships between players; for instance friend-
ships. These relationships oer benets in terms of favors, information, etc., and also
involve some costs. Moreover, players also benet from indirect relationships. A \friend
of a friend" also results in some benets, although of a lesser value than a \friend," as do
\friends of a friend of a friend" and so forth. The benet deteriorates in the \distance"
of the relationship. For instance, in the network g = f12; 23; 34g player 1 gets a benet
of Æ from the direct connection with player 2, an indirect benet of Æ
2
from the indirect
connection with player 3, and an indirect benet of Æ
3
from the indirect connection with
player 4. For Æ < 1 this leads to a lower benet from an indirect connection than a direct
one. Players only pay costs, however, for maintaining their direct relationships. These
payos and benets may be relation specic, and so are indexed by ij.
13
Note that the denition does not require that v be anonymous or that g be symmetric.
10
Formally, the payo player i receives from network g is
14
Y
i
(g) =
X
j 6=i
Æ
d(i;j)
ij
 
X
j:ij2g
c
ij
;
where d(i; j) is the number of links in the shortest path (\the geodesic") between i and
j (setting d(i; j) = 1 if there is no path between i and j). The value function in the
connections model of a network g is simply v(g) =
P
i
Y
i
(g).
The case where there are common Æ and c such that Æ
ij
= Æ and c
ij
= c for all i and
j is referred to as the \symmetric connections model".
t t t
Y
1
(g) = Æ + Æ
2
  c Y
2
(g) = 2Æ   2c
1 2 3
Y
3
(g) = Æ + Æ
2
  c
Example 2 The Spatial Connections Model [Johnson and Gilles (2000)]
An interesting version of the connections model is studied by Johnson and Gilles
(2000). This is a version with spatial costs, where there is a geography to locations and
c
ij
is related to distance. For instance, if players are spaced equally on a line and i's
location is at the point i, then costs are proportional to ji  jj.
This variation of the connections model introduces natural asymmetries among the
players and yields interesting variations on the networks that form and the ones that are
most eÆcient from society's perspective.
Example 3 Free-Trade Networks [Furusawa and Konishi (2002)]
Furusawa and Konishi (2002) consider a model where the players in the network are
countries. A link between two countries is interpreted as a free-trade agreement which
means that the goods produced in either of the countries can be traded without any
tari to consumers in the other country. In the absence of a link, goods are traded with
some tari. A link between two countries has direct eects in the trade between those
two countries, as there will be a greater ow of goods (possibly in both directions) in the
absence of any taris. There are also indirect eects from links. Countries that are not
directly involved in a link still feel some eects, as the relative prices for goods imported
from a country changes as a free-trade agreement (link) between two other countries is
put into place.
Once demands of the consumers, the production possibilities, and the taris for im-
ports from other countries (in the absence of links) are specied for each country, then
14
I omit the notation v in Y
i
(g; v) in a slight abuse of notation. Here, the allocation or payo Y is
particular to the problem, and the value function is dened base on it.
11
one can calculate the payos to each country as a function of the network of free trade
agreements, as well as the total value generated by all countries. Thus, one ends up with
a well-dened value function and allocation rule, and one can then study the incentives
for countries to form free-trade agreements.
Example 4 Market Sharing Agreements [Belleamme and Bloch (2002)]
In this model, the n players are rms who each have a home market for their goods.
Firms are symmetric to start with and so any asymmetries that arise will come from the
network structure that is formed. In this model a link represents an agreement between
two rms. In the absence of any agreement between rms i and j, rm i will sell goods
on rm j's market and vice versa. If rms i and j form a link, then that is interpreted
as a market sharing agreement where rm i refrains from selling on j's market and vice
versa.
The prots that a rm makes from selling its goods on any market are given by a
function which is the prot to a rm who is selling on market j as a function of n
j
, the
number of rms selling on market j. Once this prot function is specied, then one can
calculate the payo to each rm as a function of the network structure in place.
Example 5 Labor Markets [Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2001, 2001b)]
In this model each worker maintains social ties with some other workers. Over time,
workers randomly lose jobs and new job opportunities randomly arrive. As information
about a new job comes to a given worker, they might do several things with it. First, if
they are unemployed or the new job opportunity looks more attractive than their current
job, they might take the job themselves (or at least apply and obtain the job with some
probability). Second, in the event that the job is not right for them personally, they
may pass that information on to one or more of their friends; that is, they might pass
the information about the job onto to some of those players to whom they are linked in
the network. This passing of information leads to some probabilities that some of their
friends might obtain the job. The model can also allow for the fact that these friends
might further pass the information on, and so forth.
The set of possibilities for how information might be passed through the network
can be quite complicated. However, all that really matters in this model is what the
probability is that each player ends up getting a (new) job as a function of what the
current status of all the players in the network are. Once this is specied one has a well-
dened random (Markov) process, where one can calculate the probability distribution
of any worker's employment and wage status at any given date given any information
about the state of the network and employment statuses and wages at some previous
date. The structure of the network and the initial starting state then provide predictions
for the future expected discounted stream of wages of any worker.
12
With this network of information passing in place, and the predictions it yields for
the stream of wages of workers, one can ask what the incentives of the workers are to
maintain their position in the network versus drop out of the network. One might also
ask what their incentives are to maintain or sever links, etc.
Example 6 The Co-Author Model [Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)]
In the co-author model, each player is a researcher who spends time working on
research projects. If two researchers are connected, then they are working on a project
together. Each player has a xed amount of time to spend on research, and so the time
that researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of projects,
n
i
, that he is involved in. The synergy between two researchers depends on how much
time they spend together, and this is captured by a term
1
n
i
n
j
. Here the more projects a
researcher is involved with, the lower the synergy that is obtained per project.
Player i's payo is represented by
Y
i
(g) =
X
j:ij2g
 
1
n
i
+
1
n
j
+
1
n
i
n
j
!
for n
i
> 0, and Y
i
(g) = 1 if n
i
= 0.
So the value generated by any given research project is proportional to the sum of
the time that i puts into the project, the time that j puts into it, and a synergy that
is dependent on an interaction between the time that the two researchers put into the
project.
The total value generated by all researchers is v(g) =
P
i
Y
i
(g).
Note that in the co-author model there are no directly modeled costs to links. Costs
come indirectly in terms of diluted synergy in interaction with co-authors.
Example 7 Organizations and Externalities [Currarini (2002)]
While the general model of a network game allows for arbitrary forms of externalities,
it is useful to understand how the particular structure of externalities matters in deter-
mining which networks form. We can gain some insight from looking at various models.
For instance, we see positive externalities to other players (not involved in a new link)
when a player forms a new link in the connections model, and we see negative externali-
ties to other players when a given player forms a new link in the co-author model. While
these allow us to see some eects of dierent sorts of externalities, the models dier on
too many dimensions to be able to disentangle exactly what the impact of dierent forms
of externalities are.
An approach to studying how dierent forms of externalities impact network forma-
tion is to specify a model which has a exible enough structure so that we can include
13
positive and negative externalities as special cases, and yet at the same time we need
the model be specialized enough so we can make pointed predictions. Currarini's (2002)
model is motivated in this way.
In Currarini's model, the value of a network depends only on the partition of players
induced by the components of the network. That is, any network partitions the players
into dierent subsets, where two players are in the same subset if and only if there is
some path in the network that includes them both. The simplifying assumption that he
makes is that the value of a network g depends only on (g), so we can write v((g)).
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The reason that the network structure still plays an important role in Currarini's
analysis, is that if some group of players change their links, the resulting network (and
thus partition structure that results) depends on how they were connected to start with.
For instance, if player 2 severs all links in the network f12; 23g the resulting partition
of players is dierent from what happens when player 2 severs all links in the network
f12; 23; 13g.
Currarini's denition of positive and negative externalities is based on whether value
increases or decreases as the partition of players becomes ner.
Example 8 Unequal Connections [Goyal and Joshi (2002)]
Goyal and Joshi (2002) provide a dierent model of externalities, but one that is
similar to Currarini's in its spirit of having a specialized enough structure to allow for
pointed predictions, but still suÆcient exibility to allow for both positive and negative
externalities.
In the Goyal and Joshi model, the allocation to a given player as a function of the
network can be written as
Y
i
(g) = b
i
(g)  n
i
(g)c
where c is a cost, n
i
is the number of links that i has, and b
i
is a benet function. In
particular the benet function is assumed to take one of two forms. In the \playing the
eld" version,
b
i
(g + ij)  b
i
(g) = (n
i
(g);
X
k 6=i
n
k
(g
 i
))
where  is common to all players and g
 i
is the network with all links to i removed. Under
this assumption, players care only about how many links they have and how many links
all other players have in total. Essentially, players benet (or suer) from others' links
in symmetric ways regardless of the particulars of the path structure. The other version
of the model that they consider is the \local spillovers" version, where there is a function
 such that
b
i
(g + ij)  b
i
(g) =  (n
i
(g); n
j
(g)):
15
To be careful, the v in Currarini's analysis is a richer object than the value function dened in this
survey as Currarini's version species the value of each component as a function of the partition.
14
Here the marginal value of a link depends only on how connected the two players are,
and not on the particulars of who they are connected to or other aspects of the network.
Under these assumptions on marginal benets from links, Goyal and Joshi can then
look at positive and negative spillovers by considering how these functions change with
the n
i
's and n
j
's. Under dierent possible scenarios, they can compute the networks that
will be formed and see how these vary with the scenario.
Example 9 A Bilateral Bargaining Model [Corominas-Bosch (1999)]
Corominas-Bosch (1999) considers a bargaining model where buyers and sellers bar-
gain over prices for trade. A link is necessary between a buyer and seller for a transaction
to occur, but if a player has several links then there are several possibilities as to whom
they might transact with. Thus, the network structure essentially determines bargaining
power of various buyers and sellers.
More specically, each seller has a single unit of an indivisible good to sell which has
no value to the seller. Buyers have a valuation of 1 for a single unit of the good. If a
buyer and seller exchange at a price p, then the buyer receives a payo of 1  p and the
seller a payo of p. A link in the network represents the opportunity for a buyer and
seller to bargain and potentially exchange a good.
16
Corominas-Bosch models bargaining via the following variation on a Rubinstein bar-
gaining protocol. In the rst period sellers simultaneously each call out a price. A buyer
can only select from the prices that she has heard called out by the sellers to whom she
is linked. Buyers simultaneously respond by either choosing to accept some single price
oer they received, or to reject all price oers they received. If there are several sellers
who have called out the same price and/or several buyers who have accepted the same
price, and there is any discretion under the given network connections as to which trades
should occur, then there is a careful protocol for determining which trades occur (which
is essentially designed to maximize the number of eventual transactions).
At the end of the period, trades are made and buyers and sellers who have traded
are cleared from the market. In the next period the situation reverses and buyers call
out prices. These are then either accepted or rejected by the sellers connected to them
in the same way as described above. Each period the role of proposer and responder
switches and this process repeats itself indenitely, until all remaining buyers and sellers
are not linked to each other. Buyers and sellers are impatient and discount according to
a common discount factor 0 < Æ < 1. So a transaction at price p in period t is worth Æ
t
p
to a seller and Æ
t
(1  p) to a buyer.
16
Note that in the Corominas-Bosch framework links can only form between buyers and sellers. This
ts into the setting we are considering here where links can form between any players simply by having
the value function and allocation rule ignore any links except those between buyers and sellers.
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Given this specication and some specication of costs of links, one can calculate
the expected payo to every buyer and seller (the allocation rule) as a function of the
network structure.
Example 10 A Model of Buyer-Seller Networks [Kranton and Minehart (2001)]
The Kranton and Minehart model of buyer-seller networks is similar to the Corominas-
Bosch model described above except that the valuations of the buyers for a good are ran-
dom and the determination of prices is made through an auction rather than alternating
oers bargaining.
The Kranton and Minehart model is described as follows. Again, each seller has an
indivisible object for sale. Buyers have independently and identically distributed utilities
for the object, denoted u
i
. Each buyer knows her own valuation, but only the distribution
over other buyers' valuations, and similarly sellers know only the distribution of buyers'
valuations.
Again, link patterns represent the potential transactions, however, the transactions
and prices are determined by an auction rather than bargaining. In particular, prices rise
simultaneously across all sellers. Buyers drop out when the price exceeds their valuation
(as they would in an English or ascending oral auction). As buyers drop out, there
emerge sets of sellers for whom the remaining buyers still linked to those sellers is no
larger than the set of sellers. Those sellers transact with the buyers still linked to them.
The exact matching of whom trades with whom given the link pattern is done carefully
to maximize the number of transactions. Those sellers and buyers are cleared from the
market, and the prices continue to rise among remaining sellers, and the process repeats
itself.
For each link pattern every player has a well-dened expected payo from the above
described process (from an ex-ante perspective before buyers know their u
i
's). >From
this expected payo can be deducted costs of maintaining links to buyers and sellers to
obtain a prediction of net payos as a function of the network structure, or in other words
the allocation rule.
Example 11 Buyer-Seller Networks with Quality Dierentiated Products [Wang and
Watts (2002)]
The Wang and Watts model of buyer-seller networks enriches the above bargaining
models in the following ways. First, sellers have a choice of selling goods of either high or
low quality (which is observable to the buyer). Also, in addition to having links between
buyers and sellers, buyers and sellers may link with each other to form buyers associations
and sellers associations. The advantage of forming such associations is that they inuence
the bargaining power and the eventual prices that emerge. The disadvantage is that sales
16
may be rationed among members of an association. For instance, if a sellers association
has an excess number of members relative to the number of buyers who have linked
with it, then the determination of who gets to sell is made by a randomization. This
model brings together issues of how network structure aects bargaining power and how
collective structures can inuence such power.
The examples above provide an idea of how rich and varied the potential applications
of network models are. This is only a subset of the models in the literature. Let us now
turn to look at the ways in which the formation of networks has been analyzed.
4 Modeling Network Formation
The are many possible approaches modeling network formation.
17
An obvious one is sim-
ply to model it explicitly as a non-cooperative game, and let us start with this approach
as the literature did as well.
18
An Extensive Form Game
Aumann and Myerson (1988) were the rst to model network formation explicitly as
a game, and did so by describing an extensive form game for the formation of a network
in the context of cooperative games with communication structures.
19
In their game,
players sequentially propose links which are then accepted or rejected. The extensive
form begins with an ordering over possibly links. Let this ranking be (i
1
j
1
; : : : ; i
n
j
n
).
The game is such that the pair of players i
k
j
k
decide on whether or not to form that
link knowing the decisions of all pairs coming before them, and forecasting the play that
will come after them. A decision to form a link is binding and cannot be undone. If a
pair i
k
j
k
decide not to form a link, but some other pair coming after them forms a link,
then i
k
j
k
are allowed to reconsider their decision. This feature allows player 1 to make a
credible threat to 2 of the form \I will not form a link with 3 if you do not. But if you
do form a link with 3, then I will also do so."
In terms of its usefulness as an approach to modeling network formation, this game
has some nice features to it. However, the extensive form makes it diÆcult to analyze
beyond very simple examples and the ordering of links can have a non-trivial impact on
which networks emerge. These hurdles have prompted some other approaches.
17
The discussion here focuses on situations where players decide to participate in a link or not, modeled
in various ways. Brueckner (2003) examines an interesting alternative where players put in eort and
then links are determined randomly, but with increasing probability in players' eorts.
18
Another possibility is simply to specify some exogenous rule for adding and deleting links in a
network environment and then to run simulations. That method of studying self-organizing networks is
seen in some of the social networks literature. The idea of studying incentives and explicitly modeling
the strategic aspects of network formation is to try to put more structure and understanding behind this
process, to see which networks form and why.
19
See van den Nouweland (2003) for a detailed discussion of this game.
17
A Simultaneous Move Game
Myerson (1991) suggests a dierent game for modeling network formation. It is in a
way the simplest one that one could come up with, and as such is a natural one. It can
be described as follows.
20
The strategy space of each player is the list of other players.
So the strategy space of i is S
i
= 2
Nnfig
. Players (simultaneously) announce which other
players they wish to be connected to. If s 2 S
1
   S
n
is the set of strategies played,
then link ij forms if and only if both j 2 s
i
and i 2 s
j
.
This game has the advantage of being very simple and pretty directly capturing
the idea of forming links. Unfortunately, it generally has a large multiplicity of Nash
equilibria. For instance, s
i
= ; for all i is always a Nash equilibrium, regardless of what
the payos to various networks are. The idea is that no player suggests any links under
the correct expectation that no players will reciprocate. This is especially unnatural in
situations where links result in some positive payo. This means that in order to make
use of this game, one must really use some renement of Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
in order to really deal with the fact that it takes two players to form a link, one needs
something beyond renements like undominated Nash equilibrium or trembling hand
perfection. One needs to employ concepts such as strong equilibrium or Coalition Proof
Nash Equilibrium. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) discuss such renements in detail,
21
and the relationship of the equilibria to the concept of Pairwise Stability, which is the
concept that I discuss next.
The fact that mutual consent is needed to form a link is generally a hurdle for trying
to use any o-the-shelf noncooperative game theoretic approach. In whatever game one
species for link formation, requiring the consent of two players to form a link means
that either some sort of coalitional equilibrium concept is required, or the game needs to
be an extensive form with a protocol for proposing and accepting links in some sequence.
Another serious challenge to the o-the-shelf noncooperative game theoretic approach is
that the game is necessarily ad hoc and ne details of the protocol (e.g., the ordering
of who proposes links when, whether or not the game has a nite horizon, players are
impatient, etc.) generally matter.
Pairwise Stability
A dierent approach to modeling network formation is to dispense with the specics
of a noncooperative game and to simply model a notion of what a stable network is
directly. This is the approach that was taken by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and is
captured in the following denition.
20
See van den Nouweland (2003) for a discussion of some results for this game.
21
See also Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998), Harrison and Munoz (2002), and an earlier use
of the game in Qin (1996). See also McBride (2002) for a variation of the game and a solution concept
to allow for incomplete information of players regarding their payos and structure of the network.
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A network g is pairwise stable with respect to allocation rule Y and value function v
if
(i) for all ij 2 g, Y
i
(g; v)  Y
i
(g   ij; v) and Y
j
(g; v)  Y
j
(g   ij; v), and
(ii) for all ij =2 g, if Y
i
(g + ij; v) > Y
i
(g; v) then Y
j
(g + ij; v) < Y
j
(g; v).
The rst part of the denition of pairwise stability requires that no player wishes to
delete a link that he or she is involved in. Implicitly, any player has the discretion to
unilaterally terminate relationships that they are involved in. The second part of the
denition requires that if some link is not in the network and one of the involved players
would benet from adding it, then it must be that the other player would suer from
the addition of the link. Here it is implicit that the consent of both players is needed for
adding a link.
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This seems to be an aspect that is pervasive in applications, and is thus
important to capture in a solution concept.
While pairwise stability is natural and quite easy to work with, there are some limi-
tations of the concept that deserve discussion.
First, it is a weak notion in that it only considers deviations on a single link at a time.
This is part of what makes it easy to apply. However, if other sorts of deviations are
viable and attractive, then pairwise stability may be too weak a concept.
23
For instance,
it could be that a player would not benet from severing any single link but would benet
from severing several links simultaneously, and yet the network would still be pairwise
stable. Second, pairwise stability considers only deviations by at most a pair of players
at a time. It might be that some group of players could all be made better o by some
more complicated reorganization of their links, which is not accounted for under pairwise
stability. To the extent that larger groups can coordinate their actions in making changes
in a network, a stronger solution concept might be needed.
In both of these regards, pairwise stability might be thought of as a necessary but not
suÆcient requirement for a network to be stable over time. Nevertheless, pairwise stabil-
ity still turns out to be quite useful and in particular often provides narrow predictions
about the set of stable networks.
Strong Stability
Alternatives to pairwise stability that allow for larger coalitions than just pairs of
22
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also study another stability concept where side-payments are possible.
That is, one player can pay another (or provide some sort of favors) so that new links form whenever
the total benet to the two players involved is positive. See that paper for details.
23
One can augment pairwise stability by various extra considerations, for instance allowing players to
sever many links at once. For a look at dierent such variations, see for instance, Belleamme and Bloch
(2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2001).
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players to deviate were rst considered by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).
24
The following
denition is in that spirit, and is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2002).
25
A network g
0
2 G is obtainable from g 2 G via deviations by S if
(i) ij 2 g
0
and ij =2 g implies ij  S, and
(ii) ij 2 g and ij =2 g
0
implies ij \ S 6= ;.
The above denition identies changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the consent of any players outside of S. (i) requires that any new links that
are added can only be between players in S. This reects the fact that consent of both
players is needed to add a link. (ii) requires that at least one player of any deleted link
be in S. This reects that fact that either player in a link can unilaterally sever the
relationship.
A network g is strongly stable with respect to allocation rule Y and value function v
if for any S  N , g
0
that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, and i 2 S such that
Y
i
(g
0
; v) > Y
i
(g; v), there exists j 2 S such that Y
j
(g
0
; v) < Y
j
(g; v).
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Strong stability provides a powerful renement of pairwise stability. The concept of
strong stability mainly makes sense in smaller network situations where players have sub-
stantial information about the overall structure and potential payos and can coordinate
their actions. Thus, for instance, it might be more applicable to agreements between
rms in an oligopoly, than modeling friendships in a large society.
Strong stability also faces some high hurdles in terms of existence as it is a very
demanding concept. In fact, one might argue that this is too demanding a concept as
it might be that what appears to be an improving deviation might not be taken if one
starts to forecast how the other players might react. That is an issue that is addressed
in the recently developed notions of \farsighted" network formation, which is discussed
in the chapter by Page (2003). Nevertheless, when strongly stable networks exist, they
have very nice properties.
Forming a Network and Bargaining
24
Core-based notions had been discussed in the exchange network literature, but mainly in terms of
bargaining over value as adapted from the cooperative game theory literature. See Bienenstock and
Bonacich (1997) for an overview.
25
Konishi and

Unver (2003) develop an interesting variation of strong stability for matching games.
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The dierence between this denition of strong stability from Jackson and van den Nouweland (2002)
and that of Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) is as follows. The above denition allows for a deviation to
be valid if some members are strictly better o and others are weakly better o, while the denition in
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) considers a deviation valid only if all members of a coalition are strictly
better o. While the dierence is fairly minor, this stronger notion implies pairwise stability while Dutta
and Mutuswami's (1997) denition does not.
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The above mentioned methods of modeling network formation are such that the net-
work formation process and the allocation of value among players in a network are sepa-
rated. Currarini and Morelli (2000) provide an interesting approach where the allocation
of value among players takes place simultaneously with the link formation, as players
may bargain over their shares of value as they negotiate whether or not to add a link.
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The game that Currarini and Morelli analyze is described as follows. Players are
ordered exogenously according to a function  : N ! N . Without loss of generality
assume that this is in the order of their labels, so player 1 moves rst, then player 2 and
so forth. A player i announces the set of players with whom her or she is willing to be
linked (a
i
2 2
Nnfig
), and a payo demand d
i
2 IR. The outcome of the game is then as
follows. The actions a = (a
1
; : : : ; a
n
) determine a network g(a) by requiring that a link ij
is in g(a) if and only if j 2 a
i
and i 2 a
j
. However, the network that is eventually formed
is determined by checking which components of g(a) are actually feasible in terms of the
demands submitted. That is, if h 2 C(g(a)), then h is actually formed if and only if
P
i2N(h)
d
i
 v(h).
28
In cases where
P
i2N(h)
d
i
> v(h), the links in h are all deleted and
the players in N(h) are left without any links.
As I discuss below, the simultaneous bargaining over allocations and network forma-
tion can make an important dierence in conclusions about the eÆciency of the networks
that are formed. This means that it is an idea which must be carefully accounted for.
The main diÆculty with this approach is the specication of the bargaining game, whose
ne details (such as how the game ends) can be very important in determining what
networks form and how value is distributed.
Dynamic Models
Beyond the one-time models of network formation, one can also take a dynamic
perspective where networks are formed over time. The rst such approach was taken
by Watts (1997) in the context of the symmetric connections model (Example 1). She
modeled this as follows. First let me introduce some terminology that will be useful later
and is helpful in discussing Watts' ideas.
A network g
0
is adjacent to a network g if g
0
= g + ij or g
0
= g   ij for some ij.
A network g
0
defeats another network g if either g
0
= g ij and Y
i
(g
0
; v) > Y
i
(g
0
; v), or
if g
0
= g+ ij with Y
i
(g
0
; v)  Y
i
(g
0
; v) and Y
j
(g
0
; v)  Y
j
(g
0
; v) with at least one inequality
holding strictly.
Note that under this terminology, a network is pairwise stable if and only if it is not
defeated by an (adjacent) network.
27
See also Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b), Mutuswami and Winter (2000), and Nieva (2002),
for similar approaches, and van den Nouweland (2003) for a detailed description.
28
To understand these denitions, it is useful to think of v being component additive, so that
P
h2C(g)
v(h) = v(g).
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Watts' process can then be described as follows. The network begins as an empty
network. At each time t 2 f1; 2; : : :g a link is randomly identied. The current network is
altered if and only if the addition or deletion of the link would defeat the current network.
Thus, players add or delete links through myopic considerations of whether this would
increase their payos.
Watts says that a network is a stable state if there is some time t after which no links
would ever be added or deleted.
The set of stable states is clearly a subset of the pairwise stable networks.
The following notion from Jackson and Watts (2002a) captures this notion of se-
quences of networks where each network defeats the previous one.
An improving path
29
is a sequence of networks fg
1
; g
2
; : : : ; g
K
g where each network
g
k
is defeated by the subsequent (adjacent) network g
k+1
.
29
The term path here refers to a sequence of networks and should not be confused with a path inside
a network.
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An improving path in this example is the sequence of networks f12; 23g, f12g, f12; 34g.
Here f12; 23g is defeated by f12g, as 2 benets by severing the link 23, and this in turn
is defeated by f12; 34g as 3 and 4 both benet by adding the link 34.
A network is pairwise stable if and only if it has no improving paths emanating from
it. Note that a stable state is any pairwise stable network that can be reached by an
improving path from the empty network.
A diÆculty with the idea of a stable state is that in some situations one can get stuck
at the empty network because any single link results in a lower value, even though it
might be that larger networks are valuable. If one can start at any network, then any
pairwise stable network could be reached by an improving path. But without specifying
the process more fully, it is not clear what the right starting conditions are. Introducing
some stochastics into the picture solves this quite naturally.
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Stochastic Dynamic Models
There are two dynamic approaches which can overcome this diÆculty of getting stuck
at a network. One is to do away with the myopic nature of players' choices, as discussed
below. This makes sense in situations where the networks are relatively small, players
know each other and can make good predictions about future plays. The other approach
is to introduce some randomness in the network formation process, where links might be
added or deleted via some exogenous stimulus or simply by error or experiment on the
part of the players.
This second approach of introducing random perturbations to the formation process
was rst studied by Jackson and Watts (2002a).
30
The setup is described as follows.
Start at some network g. At each time t 2 f1; 2; : : :g a link ij is randomly identied.
Just as in the notion of improving path, we check whether the players in question would
like to add the link if it is not in the network or sever the link if it is in the network. What
is new is that the intentions of the players are only carried out with probability 1 ", and
with probability " > 0 the reverse happens. Given these random perturbations in the
process, it will go on forever, and has a chance of visiting any network. Some networks
are more likely to be visited than others, as some can only be reached through a series
of errors, while others are more naturally reached through the intentions of the players.
We can then examine this process to see which networks have the highest probability of
being reached.
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When pairwise stable networks exist, then this analysis of stochastic stability will
select a subset of them. When pairwise stable networks do not exist, the limit of the
above process will involve cycles of networks which are randomly visited over time.
The advantages of these dynamic analyses is that they can select from among the
pairwise stable networks. In the case of stochastic stability, essentially the most robust
or easy to reach networks are selected. The disadvantage with this approach is that the
limit points of the dynamics can be diÆcult to identify in some applications.
32
Farsighted Network Formation
Finally, as alluded to earlier, there is another aspect of network formation that de-
30
This was further studied in the context of the play of non-cooperative games by Jackson and Watts
(2002b), Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2000), and Droste, Gilles, and Johnson (2001). See also Skyrms
and Pemantle (2000) for a reinforcement based evolutionary analysis of games played on networks. See
Goyal (2003) for some discussion of those papers.
31
More formally, we end up with a nite state aperiodic and irreducible Markov process. Techniques
for characterizing the limiting distribution of such processes as "! 0 are well developed. In particular,
a theorem by Freidlin and Wentzell (1981), as adapted to the study of stochastic stability by Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), is the key tool. Jackson and Watts (2002a) provide details
of the adaptation of this tool to the network setting.
32
It does depend on the application. See Jackson and Watts (2002a) for more detail and some examples
(such a the bipartite matching problems) where such techniques have sharp predictions.
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serves attention. The above denitions generally either have some myopic aspect to them,
or some articial stopping point (a nite horizon to the game) which limits the ability
of other players to react. For instance, the adding or severing of one link might lead
to the subsequent addition or severing of another link. Depending on the context, this
might be an important consideration. In large networks it might be that players have
very little ability to forecast how the network might change in reaction to the addition or
deletion of a link. In such situations the myopic solutions are quite reasonable. However,
if players have very good information about how others might react to changes in the
network, then these are things that one wants to allow for either in the specication of
the game or in the denition of the stability concept.
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Recent work by Page, Wooders,
and Kamat (2002), Watts (2002), Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2002), and Deroian (2002)
address this issue. This is surveyed in the chapter by Page and Kamat (2003) and so I
will not discuss that here.
The Existence of Stable Networks
The existence of stable networks depends on which of the above approaches one takes
to modeling stability.
In the case where one uses the sequential game of Aumann and Myerson (1988)
or Currarini and Morelli (2000), existence of a (subgame perfect) equilibrium can be
established through results in the game theoretic literature.
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When looking at the simultaneous move game of Myerson (1991), existence of a variety
of types of equilibria are easily established, again via standard theorems.
The main challenges arise in coming to grips with the issue of mutual consent needed
to form a link. This occurs either in using a coalition based solution concept to solve
Myerson's game, or when one moves to notions such as pairwise stability, strong stability,
and stable states. Let me turn to what is known about these issues.
Given the nite number of possible networks, it follows that if there does not exist
any pairwise stable network, then there must exist at least one cycle: an improving path
fg
1
; g
2
; : : : ; g
K
g where g
1
= g
K
. Indeed, there are situations where there does not exist
any pairwise stable network and following improving paths only lead to cycles (where
every network is necessarily defeated by some other network).
This is demonstrated in the following example from Jackson and Watts (2002a).
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For an interesting set of experiments that compare myopic versus forward looking behavior in network
formation see Pantz and Ziegelmeyer (2003). They nd little evidence of forward-looking behavior, even
in environments designed to elicit it. While myopic behavior more closely matches the observed behavior
in a variety of settings, there is still a fair bit of behavior in the experiments that remains unexplained.
34
The game of Aumann and Myerson is a nite extensive form game of perfect information, and so
existence follows easily from well-known theorems. Currarini and Morelli have a few more hoops to jump
through as they have innite action spaces.
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Example 12 Exchange Networks { Non-existence of a Pairwise Stable Network
The society consists of n  4 players who get value from trading goods with each
other. Without going into details (see Jackson and Watts (2002a) for those), the idea is
that players have random endowments and may gain from trading with others. The more
players who are linked, the greater the potential gains from trade, but with a diminishing
return to the number of players added. Moreover, there is an externality in that the link
is costly to the players who are directly involved, but it may benet other players through
the improved ow of goods through the network. The non-existence of a pairwise stable
network is due to these external eects. Players near the end of a \line" network of more
than two, wish to sever the link to the end players as that link is more costly to maintain
than it directly benets the players involved. However, once one gets down to separate
single links, two of the players involved in dierent links would like to form add a new
link.
This is illustrated in the following gure.
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A cycle in this example is f12; 34g is defeated by f12; 23; 34g which is defeated by
f12; 23g which is defeated by f12g which is defeated by f12; 34g.
Jackson and Watts (2001) provide a result characterizing when it is that there are no
cycles and there exist pairwise stable networks. (Note that if there are no pairwise stable
networks, then there must exist a cycle.)
Y and v exhibit no indierence if for any two adjacent networks, one defeats the
other.
Proposition 13 Fix v and Y. If there exists a function w : G! IR such that [g
0
defeats
g] if and only if [w(g
0
) > w(g) and g
0
and g are adjacent], then there are no cycles.
Conversely, if Y and v exhibit no indierence, then there are no cycles only if there
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exists a function w : G! IR such that [g
0
defeats g] if and only if [w(g
0
) > w(g) and g
0
and g are adjacent]
The function w has an intuitive relationship to a potential function as dened in
non-cooperative games (see Monderer and Shapley (1996)).
While the above proposition seems diÆcult to use given that one must nd some such
w, it has some surprisingly simple applications. One application is to prove existence of
pairwise stable networks under the Myerson value which is a prominent allocation rule.
The Myerson Value
The Myerson Value is an allocation rule that was dened by Myerson (1977), in the
context of cooperative games with communication (aka cooperation) structures, that is
a variation on the Shapley value. This rule was subsequently referred to as the Myerson
Value (see Aumann and Myerson (1988)). The Myerson Value also has a corresponding
allocation rule in the context of network games as well, as shown by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). That allocation rule is expressed as follows.
Y
MV
i
(g; v) =
X
SNnfig
(v(gj
S[i
)  v(gj
S
))
 
#S!(n #S   1)!
n!
!
:
The Myerson Value follows Shapley Value style calculations and allocates value based
on those calculations. That is, we can think of building up our network by adding players
one by one, and then seeing what value is generated through this process. Players are
allocated their marginal contributions to generating overall value. In this process there
are many dierent orders in which this could be done and the factor on the right hand
side accounts for averaging over all of the dierent orderings through which we could
calculate the marginal contributions of players.
The following Proposition is due to Jackson (2003).
Proposition 14 There exists a pairwise stable network relative to Y
MV
for every v.
Moreover, all improving paths relative to Y
MV
and under any v emanating from any
network lead to pairwise stable networks. Thus, there are no cycles under the Myerson
Value allocation rule.
This can be proven a corollary to Proposition 13 by noting that
Y
MV
i
(g; v)  Y
MV
i
(g   ij; v) = w(g)  w(g   ij);
where
w(g) =
X
SN
v(gj
S
)
 
(#S   1)!(n #S)!
n!
!
:
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This proposition shows that existence of pairwise stable networks is at least very
well behaved for one prominent allocation rule. In fact, existence of pairwise stable
networks is also straightforward for two other natural rules: egalitarian and component-
wise egalitarian allocation rules.
Egalitarian Rules
The following allocation rules were dened by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
The egalitarian allocation rule Y
e
is dened by Y
e
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
. Here simply set w(g) =
v(g)
n
and apply Proposition 13, or alternatively simply note that under the egalitarian rule,
any eÆcient network will be pairwise stable.
The component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y
ce
is dened as follows. For a com-
ponent additive v and network, Y
ce
is such that for any h 2 C(g) and each i 2 N(h)
Y
ce
i
(g; v) =
v(h)
#N(h)
:
For v that is not component additive, Y
ce
(g; v) = Y
e
(g; v) for all g; so that Y
ce
splits
the value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component additive. The component-
wise egalitarian rule is one where the value of each component is split equally among
the members of the component; provided this can be done - that is, within the limits of
component additivity.
Under the component-wise egalitarian rule, one can also always nd a pairwise stable
network. However, for this rule one cannot apply Proposition 13. Instead one must
follow other lines of proof. As noted by Jackson (2003), an algorithm for nding a
pairwise stable network is as follows:
35
nd a component h that maximizes the payo
Y
ce
i
(h; v) over i and h. Next, do the same on the remaining population N nN(h), and so
on. The collection of resulting components forms the network.
36
Now that we have seen some of the methods for modeling network formation, let
us turn to one of the main foci of the literature: the relationship between the stable
networks and the eÆcient networks.
5 The Relationship Between Stability and EÆciency
Some of the very central questions about network formation concern the conditions under
which the networks which are formed by the players turn out to be eÆcient from an overall
35
This is specied for component additive v's. For any other v, Y
e
and Y
ce
coincide.
36
This follows the same argument as existence of core-stable coalition structures under the weak top
coalition property in Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez (2001). Note, however, that the networks identied
by this algorithm are not necessarily strongly stable under the denition used here.
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societal perspective. In order to discuss these issues we need to dene what we mean by
eÆciency.
An obvious notion of eÆciency is simply maximizing the overall total value among
all possible networks. This notion was referred to as strong eÆciency by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), but I will simply refer to it as eÆciency.
EÆciency
A network g is eÆcient relative to v if v(g)  v(g
0
) for all g
0
2 G.
It is clear that there will always exist at least one eÆcient network, given that there
are only a nite set of networks.
Once we begin to dene things relative to a xed allocation rule, then there is another
natural notion of eÆciency: the standard notion of Pareto eÆciency.
Pareto EÆciency
A network g is Pareto eÆcient relative to v and Y if there does not exist any g
0
2 G
such that Y
i
(g
0
; v)  Y
i
(g; v) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
To understand the relationship between the two denitions, note that g is eÆcient
relative to v if it is Pareto eÆcient relative to v and Y for all Y .
Thus, eÆciency is the more natural notion in situations where there is some freedom
to reallocate value through transfers, while Pareto eÆciency might be more reasonable
in contexts where the allocation rule is xed (and we are not able or willing to make
further transfers or to make interpersonal comparisons of utility).
Beyond these notions of eÆciency, one may want to consider others. For instance it
may be that some reallocation of value is possible, but only under the constraints that
the allocations are balanced on each component. Such constraints lead to the following
denition of constrained eÆciency introduced by Jackson (2003).
A network g is constrained eÆcient relative to v if and only if it is Pareto eÆcient
relative to v and Y for every component balanced and anonymous Y .
With denitions of eÆciency in hand, we can examine the central question of the
relationship between stability and eÆciency of networks.
I begin with the simple model of the symmetric connections model. While this is a
highly stylized model, it provides a preview of some of the tension between stability and
eÆciency and gives an idea of why such a conict might arise.
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The following propositions are from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Proposition 15 The unique eÆcient network structure in the symmetric connections
model (Example 1) is
(i) the complete graph g
N
if c < Æ   Æ
2
,
(ii) a star encompassing everyone if Æ   Æ
2
< c < Æ +
(N 2)
2
Æ
2
, and
(iii) no links if Æ +
(N 2)
2
Æ
2
< c.
The eÆcient networks take simple and intuitive forms. If link costs are high, then it
does not make sense to form any links, (iii). If link costs are low enough (c < Æ   Æ
2
),
then it makes sense to form all links as the cost of adding a link is less then the gain from
shortening any path of length at least two into a path of length one. The more interesting
case arises for intermediate costs of links. Here the only eÆcient network structure is a
star. To see why, note that a star has the minimal number of links needed to connect any
set of players. Moreover, it is the (unique) network structure that minimizes the average
path length given the minimal number of links.
Given that the star is the only eÆcient network for intermediate costs of links, we
might expect to see some conict between stability of a network and eÆciency. In a
star network in the connections model, the center player bears a great deal of cost and
provides a great deal of externalities for other players, but is not compensated for those
externalities. Thus there will be whole ranges of costs of links, where the eÆcient networks
are not pairwise stable. The description of pairwise stable networks in the symmetric
connections model, from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), is as follows.
Proposition 16 In the symmetric connections model :
(i) A pairwise stable network has at most one (non-empty) component.
(ii) For c < Æ   Æ
2
, the unique pairwise stable network is the the complete graph, g
N
.
(iii) For Æ   Æ
2
< c < Æ, a star encompassing all players is pairwise stable, but not
necessarily the unique pairwise stable graph.
(iv) For Æ < c, any pairwise stable network which is nonempty is such that each player
has at least two links and thus is ineÆcient.
37
As we expected, for high and low costs to links, eÆcient networks coincide with the
pairwise stable networks, and the problematic case is for intermediate costs to links.
37
If Æ +
(N 2)
2
Æ
2
> c, then all pairwise stable networks are ineÆcient since then the empty graph is
also ineÆcient.
31
For instance, consider a situation where n = 4 and Æ < c < Æ+
Æ
2
2
. Here a star network
is the unique eÆcient structure. However, the only pairwise stable network is the empty
network. To see this, note that since c > Æ a player gets a positive payo from a link
only if it also oers an indirect connection. Thus, clearly the star will not be pairwise
stable as the center bears more cost for each link than it gets in benets. Moreover, this
implies that if a network is nonempty and stable then each player must have at least two
links, as if i has only one link and it is to j, then j would benet from severing that
link. We can also see in this cost range that a player maintains at most 2 links, since
the payo to a player with three links (given n = 4) is less than 0 since c > Æ. So, a
pairwise stable network would have to be a ring (e.g., f12; 23; 34; 14g). However, such a
network is not pairwise stable since the payo to any player is increased by severing a
link. For instance, 1's payo in the ring is 2Æ + Æ
2
  2c, while severing the link 14 leads
to Æ + Æ
2
+ Æ
3
  c which is higher since c > Æ.
Although the empty network is the unique pairwise stable network, it is not even
Pareto eÆcient. The empty network is Pareto dominated by a line (e.g., g = f12; 23; 34g).
To see this, not that under the line, the payo to the end players (1 and 4) is Æ+Æ
2
+Æ
3
 c
which is greater than 0, and to the middle two players (2 and 3) the payo is 2Æ+ Æ
2
 2c
which is also greater than 0 since c < Æ +
Æ
2
2
.
Thus, there exist cost ranges under the symmetric connections model for which all
pairwise stable networks are Pareto ineÆcient, and other cost ranges where all pairwise
stable networks are eÆcient. There are also some cost ranges where some pairwise sta-
ble networks are eÆcient and some other pairwise stable networks are not even Pareto
eÆcient.
Even when there are some eÆcient networks that are pairwise stable in the symmetric
connections model, they might not be reached. For instance, Watts (1997) shows that
as n increases, the probability that the resulting stable state is a star goes to 0. Thus
as the population increases the particular ordering which is needed to form a star (the
eÆcient network) becomes less and less likely relative to orderings leading to some other
stable states. Watts' (1997) result is stated as follows.
Proposition 17 Consider the symmetric connections model in the case where Æ   Æ
2
<
c < Æ. As the number of players grows, the probability that a stable state (under the
process where each link has an equal probability of being identied) is reached with the
eÆcient network structure of a star goes to 0.
The above propositions show us that there may be cases where the networks that are
pairwise stable (or stable states) are not eÆcient, nor even Pareto eÆcient.
At this point there is a series of important questions that come up.
We begin to see from the connections model that some reallocation of value might
be natural, and might help reconcile eÆciency and stability. For instance, the center of
32
the star could negotiate with the other players to receive some payments or favors for
maintaining her links with the other players.
38
If we start to account for such reallocations
can we reconcile eÆciency and stability?
As there are many ways to address these issues, let us list some of the questions that
come to mind.
(1) If we can control the allocation rule, can we always design an allocation rule such
that at least one eÆcient network is pairwise stable?
(2) Can we always design an allocation rule such that at least one eÆcient network is
pairwise stable if we impose some minimal conditions on the allocation rule such
as anonymity and component balance?
(3) If the answer to (2) is no, what if we weaken the demands on eÆciency, or on
anonymity or on component balance?
(4) If the answer to (2) is no, is there some nice class of situations where we can
design an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule such that at least
one eÆcient network is pairwise stable?
(5) For a given allocation rule of interest, which are the classes of value functions for
which eÆcient and stable networks coincide?
(6) What can we say about these questions for alternative stability notions?
(7) Will eÆcient networks be formed if bargaining over the allocation and the network
formation are tied together?
The answer to question (1) (whether we can design an allocation rule that reconciles
eÆciency and stability) is yes, and it is easy to see. Consider the egalitarian allocation
rule, Y
e
. This completely aligns player incentives and overall eÆciency as players' payos
are directly proportional to overall network value. Thus, under the egalitarian allocation
rule every eÆcient network is pairwise stable, and in fact strongly stable.
While this is partly reassuring, it turns out that this answer is really dependent on
such a full reallocation of value. A fully egalitarian rule has nice incentive properties, but
it is an extreme rule and in particular requires that value be allocated across dierent
components. That is, the egalitarian rule fails to satisfy component balance. In the long
run this might be problematic, as some components will be receiving less than their value
and might benet from seceding.
This takes us to question (2) - as to whether or not we can nd an allocation rule
for which eÆciency and stability are reconciled, while at the same time satisfying some
simple conditions such as component balance and anonymity. The following proposition
38
In fact, intuition from the sociology literature would suggest that a player in such a central position
should receive a high payo (e.g., see Burt (1992)).
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shows that there is no component balanced and anonymous allocation rule for which it
is always the case that some eÆcient network is pairwise stable. Thus, the answer to (2)
is no. This proposition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
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Proposition 18 There does not exist any component balanced and anonymous allocation
rule such that for every v there exists an eÆcient network that is pairwise stable.
The proof of Proposition 18 shows that there is a particular v such that for every
component balanced and anonymous allocation rule none of the constrained eÆcient
networks are pairwise stable.
To see the proof, simply consider the following example with n = 3 players. Here v
is such that any one-link network has a value of 1, any two-link network has a value of
13/12, and the complete network has a value of 1. This is as pictured in the following
gure.
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So, in this example the eÆcient network structure is a two-link network. Now let
us consider what allocations have to be. By anonymity and component balance, the
allocations in one-link and three-link networks are completely determined. Each player
connected in a one-link network gets an allocation of
1
2
. Each player in the complete
network gets an allocation of
1
3
. Let us consider what the possibilities are for a two-link
network, with the idea that we would like to make the two-link network pairwise stable.
In order for a two-link network to be pairwise stable it must be that the middle player
(who has two links) gets an allocation of at least
1
2
or else he would benet from severing
one of the links. Also, for a two-link network to be pairwise stable the other two players
must each get an allocation of at least
1
3
or else they would benet from adding a link
between them. Unfortunately
1
2
+
1
3
+
1
3
>
13
12
, and so this is not feasible. Thus, there
39
Jackson (2003) shows that the proposition can be strengthened to only require equal treatment of
equals rather than anonymity, and that it also holds if eÆciency of the network is replaced by constrained
eÆciency. Arguably, if one is requiring component balance of the allocation rule, then the eÆciency
notion should be similarly dened and so constrained eÆciency is the appropriate notion. See Jackson
(2003) for details.
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is no possible allocation rule satisfying anonymity and component balance such that the
eÆcient network is pairwise stable here.
The answer to question (3) is that the conditions of anonymity and component balance
do play important roles in the incompatibility of stability and eÆciency. If we drop either
of the conditions then we can reconcile eÆciency and stability. That is, Proposition 18
is tight.
Let us examine each aspect of the proposition. If we drop component balance, then
as mentioned before the egalitarian allocation rule will always have all eÆcient networks
being (strongly) stable.
If we drop anonymity (or equal treatment of equals), then a careful and clever con-
struction of Y by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) ensures that some eÆcient network is
strongly stable for a class of v. This is stated in the following proposition.
Let V

= fv 2 V j g 6= ; ) v(g) > 0g. This is a class of value functions where any
network generates a positive value.
The following proposition is due to Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).
Proposition 19 There exists a component balanced Y such that for any v 2 V

, some
eÆcient network is pairwise stable. Moreover, while Y is not anonymous, it is still
anonymous on some networks that are both eÆcient and pairwise stable.
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This proposition shows that if one can design an allocation rule, and only wishes to
satisfy anonymity on stable networks, then eÆciency and stability are compatible.
Next, let us consider the question of requiring the allocation rule to be component
balanced and anonymous, but weakening eÆciency to only require Pareto eÆciency. If we
do this, then the component-wise egalitarian rule ensures that for any value function at
least one pairwise stable network is Pareto eÆcient, as stated in the following proposition.
Let g(v; S) = argmax
g2g
S
v(g)
#N(g)
denote the network with the highest per capita value
out of those that can be formed by players in S  N .
Given a component additive v, nd a network g
v
through the following algorithm. Pick
some h
1
2 g(v;N) with a maximal number of links. Next, pick some h
2
2 g(v;N nN(h
1
))
with a maximal number of links. Iteratively, at stage k pick a new component h
k
2
40
Dutta and Mutuswami work with a variation of strong stability. As mentioned before, their version
of strong stability is not quite a strengthening of pairwise stability, as it only considers one network to
defeat another if there is a deviation by a coalitions that makes all of its members strictly better o;
while pairwise stability allows one of the two players adding a link to be indierent. However, one can
check that the construction of Dutta and Mutuswami extends to pairwise stability as well.
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g(v;N n N([
ik 1
h
i
)) with a maximal number of links. Once there are only empty
networks left stop. The union of the components picked in this way denes a network g
v
.
The following proposition is a variation on one due to Banerjee (1999).
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Proposition 20 Under a component additive v, a g
v
dened by the above algorithm is a
pairwise stable and Pareto eÆcient network under the component-wise egalitarian rule.
While this proposition is of some interest, given that we are allowing reallocation of
value, it's not clear that Pareto eÆciency is the right notion of eÆciency. In particu-
lar, constrained eÆciency seems to be more appropriate, and under that condition the
proposition no longer is true, as we have seen already in Proposition 18 (and its footnote).
So, reconciling the tension between stability and eÆciency will require giving some-
thing up in terms of our desired conditions of anonymity, component balance, and eÆ-
ciency; and so to some extent this tension is a characteristic of network games.
This leads us to another one of our questions (4): is there some nice class of situations
where we can design an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule such that at
least one eÆcient network is pairwise stable? That is, the tension arises for some value
functions, but not all. What do we know about the structure of value functions for which
there is (or is not) a tension?
The following proposition provides a partial answer to (4) by identifying a very par-
ticular feature of the tension between eÆciency and stability. It shows that in situations
where eÆcient networks are such that each player has at least two links, there is no ten-
sion. So, problems arise only in situations where eÆcient networks involve players who
may be thought of as \loose ends."
A network g has no loose ends if for any i 2 N(g), #fjjij 2 gg  2.
The following proposition is due to Jackson (2003).
Proposition 21 There exists an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule
such that if v is anonymous and has an eÆcient network with no loose ends, then there
is at least one eÆcient network (with no loose ends) that is pairwise stable.
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Banerjee (1999) actually works with a weighted version of the component-wise egalitarian rule, which
is a straightforward generalization of this result. Also, he works with a notion of strong stability, but one
that only accounts for deviations that make all players strictly better o. Note that g
v
will not always
be strongly stable under the denition here. Finally, the algorithm here is a bit dierent from his, as
I require the maximal number of links in the denition of each h
k
, and this is critical to guaranteeing
pairwise stability. Banerjee does not have to worry about this since his denition of stability only
considers deviations where all deviating players are strictly better o.
36
The proof of proposition 21 is constructive, showing that a variation on the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule works. This tells us that the tension between eÆciency
and stability has some natural limits, and must involve situations where eÆcient networks
are such that some players have just one link.
The analysis in the last few propositions took a \design" perspective, in that the
question was asked as to whether there existed any allocation rule that would reconcile
eÆciency and stability. More generally, however, the allocation rule might be determined
naturally by the environment. To the extent that we cannot intervene (or prefer not to
unless needed), it is important to know when there will be a tension between eÆciency
and stability for a given allocation rule.
The diÆculty in addressing this issue is that the space of allocation rules is quite
large and so providing a characterization of when there are tensions and when not, is an
overwhelming task. What we might do, is instead simply look at some natural allocation
rules and natural settings. Many of the examples from Section 3 are ones for which this
is the approach that has been taken. There a setting, value function, and allocation rule
are given by the model, and then one analyzes which networks are stable and can address
the issue of whether they are eÆcient. This is a valuable exercise, and provides some
insights. The results, however, are particular to the models in question. Given the limits
on the length of this survey, I will not go over those results here.
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In order to get a bit broader view, we can look at question (5): For given allocation
rules, what are the classes of value functions for when it is that eÆcient and stable
networks coincide?
A natural starting point for this question is to work with the most obvious of com-
ponent balanced and anonymous allocation rules, the component-wise egalitarian rule.
A strong reason for doing this is that we know the egalitarian rule has very nice incen-
tive properties, and so the component-wise version would seem to be a nice one to work
with under the constraint of component balance. The following proposition provides a
characterization of when the component-wise egalitarian rule works well.
A link ij is critical to the graph g if g  ij has more components than g or if i is only
linked to j under g.
A critical link is one such that if it is severed, then the component that it was a
part of will become two components (or one of the nodes will become disconnected).
Let h denote a component which contains a critical link and let h
1
and h
2
denote the
components obtained from h by severing that link (where it may be that h
1
= ; or
h
2
= ;).
42
The reader is referred to the papers themselves. The reader can also nd some comparison across
some of the bargaining models in Jackson (2003).
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The pair (g; v) satises critical link monotonicity if, for any critical link in g and its
associated components h, h
1
, and h
2
, we have that v(h)  v(h
1
) + v(h
2
) implies that
v(h)=#N(h)  max[v(h
1
)=#N(h
1
); v(h
2
)=#N(h
2
)].
The following proposition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
Proposition 22 If g is eÆcient relative to a component additive v, then g is pairwise
stable for Y
ce
relative to v if and only if (g; v) satises critical link monotonicity.
Question (6) asks about the relationship between eÆciency and stability for stability
notions other than pairwise stability. Short of the consideration of bargaining together
with network formation (question (7)), the only analysis has been in terms of strong
stability.
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Note that strong stability goes a long way towards guaranteeing at least
Pareto eÆciency simply by denition, and so it will not be too surprising that the issue
will largely boil down to existence of strongly stable networks. It also turns out that an
interesting implication of strong stability is that if we have an eÆcient network being
strongly stable, then the allocation we are working with must be the component-wise
egalitarian rule, at least on the given network. This makes the component-wise egalitarian
rule a natural one to focus on. These ideas are formalized as follows.
An allocation rule Y is component decomposable if Y
i
(g; v) = Y
i
(gj
S
; v) for each
component additive v, g 2 G, S 2 (g), and i 2 S.
Component decomposability requires that in situations where v is component additive,
the way in which value is allocated within a component does not depend on the structure
of other components. So, in situations where there are no externalities across components,
the allocation within a component is independent of the rest of the network. For instance,
the players within a component need not pay attention to, and might not even be aware
of, the organization of other components.
The following proposition is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2002).
Proposition 23 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v 2 V.
If Y is an anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation rule
and g 2 G with (g) 6= fNg is a network that is strongly stable with respect to Y and v,
then Y (g; v) = Y
ce
(g; v) and Y
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for each i 2 N .
While Proposition 23 only ties down the allocation rule on strongly stable networks,
it still strongly suggests the component-wise egalitarian rule as a focal one. So let us
examine when eÆcient networks are strongly stable under that allocation rule.
43
There is analysis of other formation models in the context of directed networks. One can nd some
discussion of that in the chapter by Goyal (2003).
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A value function v is top convex if some eÆcient network also maximizes the per-
capita value among players.
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That is, the value function v is top convex if there exists
an eÆcient g such that
v(g)
n

v(g
0
)
#N(g
0
)
for all g
0
.
Top convexity implies that all components of an eÆcient network must lead to the
same per-capita value. If some component led to a lower per capita value than the
average, then another component would have to lead to a higher per capita value than
the average which would contradict top convexity.
Jackson and van den Nouweland (2002) prove the following proposition.
Proposition 24 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v.
The set of eÆcient networks coincides with the set of strongly stable networks under
the component-wise egalitarian rule if and only if v is top convex. Moreover, the set of
strongly stable networks is nonempty under the component-wise egalitarian rule if and
only if v is top convex.
To get some feeling for the top-convexity condition, note that in the symmetric con-
nections model v is top convex for all values of Æ 2 [0; 1) and c  0, so that all networks
that are strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
and v are eÆcient with respect to v. This
means that top-convexity is a condition that is satised in some natural situations. How-
ever, it is still a demanding condition that has strong implications.
Simultaneous Network Formation and Allocation of Value
Finally, let us turn to question (7) regarding what happens when the allocation of
value and the formation of the network occur as part of the same bargaining process.
Currarini and Morelli (2000) show that for a wide class of value functions, all subgame
perfect equilibria of their formation game are eÆcient. As this applies for a fairly broad
class of value functions, it shows that under some assumptions the tension between
stability and eÆciency may be overcome if bargaining over value is tied to link formation.
Let us examine their result in more detail.
A value function v satises size monotonicity if v(g) > v(g   ij) for every g and
critical link ij 2 g.
While this is a demanding condition, it is one that is often satised in situations
where large networks are eÆcient. The demanding aspect of the condition is that it must
hold for all g. It is not clear to what extent that aspect of the condition is vital to the
following result.
The following proposition is due to Currarini and Morelli (2000).
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A related condition is called \domination by the grand coalition," as dened in the context of a
cooperative game by Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993).
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Proposition 25 If v satises size monotonicity, then every (subgame perfect) equilib-
rium of the Currarini and Morelli bargaining and network formation game leads to an
eÆcient network.
Mutuswami and Winter (2000) also discuss a similar network formation game and
show that such positive results hold for even more general value functions, under a
slightly dierent formulation. In their analysis, players receive increasing benets in the
size of the network and incur increasing costs. The game is such that instead of making
demands on how much value they desire, players indicate how much they will contribute
towards the cost of links. Moreover, Mutuswami and Winter show that a variation on the
game results in payos that mirror the Shapley Value calculations of a related cooperative
game.
One aspect of these results deserves discussion. The nite ending point of the game
provides for strong bargaining power for early players in the sequence. They essentially
demand what can maximally be extracted given what the other players will end up getting
from the subsequent game. The maximum value comes from the eÆcient network, as the
game really boils down to a bargaining one. It is not so clear what would happen if the
bargaining protocol went on in some way, either with discounting or with players being
able to revise demands and actions. Proposition 25 is still very important in pointing
out the potential role of simultaneous formation of links and bargaining over value, but
whether this will turn out to be robust to variations in the protocol is not yet clear.
6 The Myerson Value and alternative Allocation Rules
In addition to the literature that has concentrated on questions of whether or not eÆcient
networks are formed, there is also a literature that has looked in detail at the axiomatic
foundations of some allocation rules. To some extent, the axiomatic treatment of allo-
cation rules is the \cooperative" counter-part to the \non-cooperative" analysis of the
stability of networks. The axiomatic literature largely grew out of the cooperative game
theory literature and mostly followed cooperative games with communication or cooper-
ation structures. However, almost all of the studies there have fairly easy extensions to
the more general network game setting.
Much of the literature on cooperative games with communication structures is dis-
cussed in the chapter by van den Nouweland (2003), and so I only briey discuss here a
small part of that axiomatic literature here. In particular I discuss a part that is closely
related to the idea that networks are not xed, but something that is subject to the
discretion of the players involved; which is the part that is most closely linked to ideas
of network formation.
In order to discuss these issues, let us rst observe a characterization of the Myerson
Value allocation rule, which is the most prominent allocation rule.
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Equal Bargaining Power and the Myerson Value
An allocation rule satises equal bargaining power if for any component additive v
and g 2 G
Y
i
(g)  Y
i
(g   ij) = Y
j
(g)  Y
j
(g   ij):
Note that equal bargaining power does not require that players split the marginal value of
a link. It just requires that they equally benet or suer from its addition. It is possible
(and generally the case) that Y
i
(g)  Y
i
(g   ij) + Y
j
(g)  Y
j
(g   ij) 6= v(g)  v(g   ij).
The following proposition from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is a fairly direct exten-
sion of Myerson's (1977) result from the setting of cooperative games with communication
structures to the network game setting.
Proposition 26 Y satises component balance and equal bargaining power if and only
if Y (g; v) = Y
MV
(g; v) for all g 2 G and any component additive v.
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) extend the characterization to allow for weighted bar-
gaining power, and show that one obtains a version of a weighted Shapley (Myerson)
Value.
While the Myerson Value is an interesting allocation rule, the perspective it takes is
problematic from a network formation perspective.
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The basic problem with it is that
the value of other possible networks is not properly accounted for in its calculations.
This is especially bothersome in situations where the network is something that can be
changed or is being formed. The basic idea is as follows. If the network is something
that can be changed, or is such that alternative possible network structures are taken into
account when bargaining over how to allocate value, then values of alternative networks,
and not just sub-networks, should be important in determining the allocation. If the
network is completely xed and cannot be changed, then it is not clear why the value of
sub-networks (and only sub-networks) should enter allocation calculations.
These criticisms can be made more precise by looking at some very simple examples.
Example 27 A Criticism of the Myerson Value
Consider a value function v where v(f12g) = v(f23g) = 1, v(f12; 23g) = 1, and
v(g) = 0 for all other networks. In this case only the network f12; 23g and its nonempty
subnetworks generate value.
45
See Jackson (2003b) for a detailed discussion.
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Consider another value function v
0
dened by v
0
(g) = 1 for all g 6= ;. That is, under
v
0
the value every non-empty network is 1.
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Note that
Y
MV
(f12; 23g; v) = Y
MV
(f12; 23g; v
0
) =

1
6
;
2
3
;
1
6

:
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The Myerson Value allocation rule provides the same allocation on the network
f12; 23g, regardless of whether the value function is v or v
0
. In particular, player 2
gets a bigger allocation in the network f12; 23g than the other players. This reects
player 2's status in two links in the network, and comes about through the Shapley
Value style calculations underlying the Myerson Value, where we can think of building
up the network f12; 23g by adding players one at a time.
While player 2's position is special in the network f12; 23g, player 2's status is not at
all special if the value function is v
0
. That is, any player could have equally well served
that central position. In fact, any non-empty network would provide the same value as
the network f12; 23g. To the extent that the network is something that can be altered,
there is no reason that player 2 should enjoy special treatment under v
0
, and one might
argue that all players should receive equal payments.
To see some of the issues in more detail, one can look at the conditions that charac-
terize the Myerson Value.
Example 28 A Criticism of the Equal Bargaining Power
Next, let v(f12g) = v(f23g) = 1 and v(g) = 0 for all other networks. Here any single
link network that involves player 2 will generate a value of 1, while all other networks
generate a value of 0.
Any allocation rule, including the Myerson Value, that satises equal bargaining
power (and allocates 0 to the players on the empty network) will have Y
1
(f12g; v) =
Y
2
(f12g; v).
Other networks have v = 0
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Here, there is a real asymmetry among the players and player 2 is more a critical
player than the others. It is not at all clear why we should require that the allocation to
players 1 and 2 be the same in the network f12g, as player 2 has a viable outside option
while player 1 does not.
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For instance, if one brings in Core-based considerations, then in fact the full value should be given
to player 2 in this example.
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There are other criticisms that can be made, including pointing out problems with
component balance. In response to these criticisms, Jackson (2003b) proposes the fol-
lowing allocation rule. First an auxiliary denition is needed.
Given a value function v, its monotonic cover
b
v is dened by
b
v(g) = max
g
0
g
v(g
0
):
The monotonic cover of a value function looks at the highest value that can be achieved
by building a network out of a given set of links. The monotonic cover captures the
perspective that the network is exible, and so can be reorganized to produce the highest
possible value.
Using this perspective leads to a natural adaptation of the Shapley Value to network
games which results in the following allocation rule, which Jackson called the Player-
Based Flexible Network Allocation Rule.
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Y
PBFN
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
b
v(g
N
)
X
SNnfig
(
b
v(g
S[i
) 
b
v(g
S
))
 
#S!(n #S   1)!
n!
!
:
This allocation rule looks at the value that any group of players S could generate by
forming the best possible network they could. Then through Shapley-style calculations,
it looks at the marginal value generated by adding a player to dierent groups, and then
the allocation is in proportion to these marginal contributions.
On a supercial level this rule bears some similarities to the Myerson Value because
we see Shapley Value style calculations. However, it is a quite dierent allocation rule. In
fact, it violates both equal bargaining power and component balance, and is characterized
by conditions that are violated by the Myerson Value. For instance, looking back at
Example 27, Y
PBFN
provides allocations that dier on v and v
0
. In fact, it agrees with
the Myerson Value under v and in contrast is fully egalitarian under v
0
. In Example 28 it
provides higher allocations to player 2 than the others, again in contrast to the Myerson
Value.
More generally, once one takes this perspective that alternative network structures
should matter in determining an allocation, a variety of cooperative game theoretic solu-
tions concepts, including, for example, the Nucleolus, can be called upon in addition to
the Shapley value. The simple idea is that the monotonic cover
b
v, can be used to dene a
cooperative game w(S) =
b
v(g
S
), which can then be used as a basis for allocating value.
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Jackson (2003b) also proposes other allocation rules. One is a slight variation on this and is \link-
based". For more on the idea of allocating value based on links rather than players see Meessen (1988)
and Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992). The idea is instead to apply the value to links rather than players,
and then to assign the value to players based on the links that they control. Other variations involve
using other solution concepts such as the Nucleolus.
48
See Jackson (2003b) for details.
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7 Concluding Discussion
Directed Networks
The survey here has focussed on the case of non-directed networks. More specically,
the important aspect here is the treatment of situations where a link between two players
requires the consent of both parties. While this non-directed or mutual consent case
covers many (if not most) situations of interest, the case where links are directed and
may be formed unilaterally also includes some important settings. For instance, a web
site can provide a link or pointer to another web site without the second web site's
permission. Likewise if we consider a network of researchers and examine who cites
whom, this is another network that is both directed and where links can be formed
unilaterally, as one researcher can generally cite another researcher without the second
researcher's permission.
While the analysis of directed networks is dierent from that of non-directed networks,
the overall themes end up being similar. The main dierences are in modeling network
formation, which is simpler due to the unilateral action, and of course in the applications
covered. In particular, there still exists a tension between stability and eÆciency (see
Dutta and Jackson (2000)), and, again, there are situations where eÆcient networks
self-organize quite naturally. For instance, Bala and Goyal (2000a) consider a directed
version of the connections model, and nd that in situations where the decay is not too
high (Æ is close to 1) eÆcient networks are the unique strict Nash equilibrium networks
in a directed variation of Myerson's (1991) network formation game. This is discussed in
more detail in the chapter by Goyal (2003), and so I will not say more here.
Closing Remarks
The literature surveyed here helps us to understand network formation. As networks
are pervasive in social and economic interactions, this literature was really inevitable.
As we have seen, there are interesting and somewhat unexpected relationships between
which networks are eÆcient from society's perspective and which networks form as the
result of player incentives. Another thing that we have learned is that explicit modeling
of networks is tractable, and that a valuable theory can be developed.
While the literature has made some progress, there is still good news for researchers.
Namely, there are many important and interesting open questions in this area that are
manageable and just waiting for attention. Some of these questions involve theoretical
modeling, such as developing further understanding of the relationship between stable and
eÆcient networks and how this depends on the setting, and further exploring the simul-
taneous bargaining over the allocation of value and the formation of networks, and more
generally understanding how side payments might aect network formation. But these
questions also go well beyond the theoretical, to include the empirical and experimental
analysis of models of economic networks. I have not really touched upon these here,
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partly because those areas are so wide open. Some folks are pioneering into these areas,
as we see on the experimental side in Corbae and Duy (2000), Charness, Corominas-
Bosch, and Frechette (2001), and Callander and Plott (2002), Pantz and Ziegelmeyer
(2003), and Falk and Kosfeld (2003) (see Kosfeld (2003) for a recent survey).
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Work on
the empirical side has a longer tradition dating back to early studies on contact networks
in labor economics (e.g., Rees (1966)), but is enjoying new interest as in in recent work
by Topa (2000), Fafchamps and Lund (2000), and Aizer and Currie (2002).
There are also some substantial challenges for the future literature on networks that
is coming out of economics and game theory. One challenge is bridging to the sociology
(\social networks") literature.
50
That literature is well-established, very large, and full of
interesting questions, insights, data sets, and knowledge of network structure and what
inuences it. The main challenge comes in the dierences in terminology, the points
of view, and the techniques of analysis. As the literatures continue to grow, the cross
fertilization which is just beginning now should become more and more natural.
49
I should be careful to say that the experimental research on exchange networks from the sociological
side is quite extensive (e.g., see Bienenstock and Bonacich (1993)), as is the empirical analysis of various
network structures (e.g., see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and the references therein). So, here I am
referring more to the questions of network formation and the testing of formal models of formation, as
well as analyses of the eÆciency of observed networks.
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To a more limited extent, the same can be said for bridging to the agent-based computation models,
where many network situations have be analyzed. There is more natural overlap there, as the underlying
view of players' incentives and the terminology are closer to begin with.
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